Seminar "Affective problems" (MA4), spring semester, Wednesday 10-12, B104

(back to Thumos Wiki)

Evaluation

Enseignement: un cours ou séminaire de 2 heures annuelles

Attestation: Travail écrit de 12 pages eviron (24'000 signes [sans espaces]) dans le cadre d'un séminaire, ou présentation orale et complément écrit.

Évaluation: un examen oral de 45 min. environ portant sur les enseignements.

Program

• 18 février : (Resp : Olivier) : Jennie Louise, "Offensive Jokes, Comic Moralism and the Wrong Kind of Reason"

• 25 février : (Resp : Julien) : Otto Bruun, "Belief and Emotion".

• 4 mars : (Resp: Olivier) : Ingrid Vendrell Ferran, "Emotion, Reason and Truth in Literature", Part I

• 11 mars : (Resp : Federico) : Ingrid Vendrell Ferran, "Emotion, Reason and Truth in Literature", Part II

• 18 mars : (Resp : Alain) : Olivier Massin, "Selfless perception"

• 25 mars : (Resp : Alain) : Tom Cochrane, 'Emotion as Regulation' : This paper situates the representational function of emotion within its regulatory function, and argues that simulation plays a necessary role in generating the emotional response. This view emerges from a critique of the perceptual theory of emotions, reconfiguring the Dretskean causal model of perception with the aid of cybernetic-style negative feedback loops. It incorporates the several advantages of the perceptual theory, while also helping to elucidate the phenomenology of emotions, their appropriateness and their connection to value.

• 1 avril : (Resp : Olivier) : Otto Bruun, "Recalcitrant emotions"

• 8 avril : (Resp : Julien) : Olivier Massin, "Affectives acts and affective sensations"

(9-20 avril vacances de Pâques)

• 22 avril : (Resp : Julien) : Julien Deonna, "Taking affective explanations to heart" : In this article, J. Deonna & F. Teroni take seriously the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations existing among the phenomena they cover. They argue that whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability in the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability in the moods (episodes) she is likely to feel. The rationale for this distinction, the authors claim, lies in the fact that, whereas appeal to character traits or sentiments in explanation is tantamount to making sense of a given behaviour in terms of an individual’s specific evaluative perspective --- as embodied in this individual’s emotional profile --- appeal to temperaments makes sense of it independently of any such evaluative perspective.

• 29 avril : (Resp :Federico) : Eva-Maria Engelen, "The intentionality of emotions"

• 6 mai : (Resp : Alain) : Andrew Reisner, "The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

Problem"

• 13 mai : (Resp : Olivier) : Davide Fassio, "Some remarks on detachment"

• 20 mai : (Resp : Alain) : Jérôme Dokic "Perceptual recognition and the feeling of presence"

• 21 mai : J. Broome, title TBA

• 27 mai : (Resp: Federico) : Sebastian Aeschbach, Le ressentiment

(fin des cours 29 mai)