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Revision as of 12:49, 11 May 2012

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Reference: Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1997) Images of Identity: In Search of Modes of Presentation, Mind, 106 (423): 499-519.

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*14~~.06: Monika Betzler, "Enhancing our Emotions"~~

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*14.06: Amanda Garcia, “What Video Games Can Teach us about Fiction and Emotions”

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~~Abstract:~~

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In current theorizing, concepts of autonomy and authenticity are used to justify measures of neuro-enhancement (NE), i.e. the use of pharmaceuticals to enhance a person’s emotions. In this article, I pursue three aims.

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(1)In light of the current debate, I show which conception of autonomy is adequate to allow, in principle at least, for uses of NE. I defend a wide notion of autonomy that remains neutral with regard to the idea of self-change, and thus allows a non-circular justification of self-change by NE. I maintain that such a wide notion of autonomy must satisfy both a control condition and a valuing condition. In addition, autonomy must be conceived as an independent value. Measures of NE can then be evaluated with respect to how they help realize the value of the person’s autonomy.

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(2) In light of these clarifications, I examine which kinds of emotional changes can be regarded as enhancing a person’s autonomy. It turns out that only the enhancement of rational emotions can serve the function to satisfy both the control and valuing conditions of autonomy.

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(3) Finally, I discuss whether NE can be regarded as an enhancement of the rationality of a person’s emotions. There are two reasons to remain skeptical: On the one hand, NE threatens to undermine two further conditions of autonomy, i.e., a person’s strength of will and her ongoing self-understanding. On the other hand, NE turns out to be problematic on conceptual grounds: Pharmaceuticals are unable to distinguish between rational and irrational emotions.

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*21.06: Amanda Garcia, “What Video Games Can Teach us about Fiction and Emotions”

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Philosophy of fiction is often based on the examination of literary fictions. Recently, however, philosophers have argued that we have to take into account other media, in order to be able to propose comprehensive theories of fiction or art. In this context, the recent philosophical interest shown for videogames has its role to play. By considering videogames, as examples of interactive fictions, we can refine our understanding of fiction in general.

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Contra Tavinor, I will argue that the game/work world distinction is preserved in videogames. However, interactive videogames give us reasons to question the scope of the fictional operator. This in turn motivates a second look at the scope of the fictional operator in the case of non-interactive fiction.

In a second time, I will focus on the nature of our affective reactions to fictional works. First, interactive videogames, notably by giving us reasons to question the scope of the fictional operator, contribute to make it more plausible that we can have genuine emotions in reaction to fiction. Second, the comparison between interactive and non-interactive fictions teach us lessons as to the different kinds of affective reactions provoked by fiction.

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I will conclude by arguing that works of fiction can provoke both genuine emotions and quasi-emotions, and that the kind of fiction one engages with affects the kind of affective reactions one can have towards it.

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I will conclude by arguing that works of fiction can provoke both genuine emotions and quasi-emotions, and that the kind of fiction one engages with affects the kind of affective reactions one can have towards it.emotions.

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 |04.05.2012 Feldman&Conee, Jacques || Nathanaël Bovier || 6
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-|11.05.2012 Sider, Damiano || Lélia Piccot & Axel Moeschler || note
+|11.05.2012 Sider, Damiano || Lélia Piccot & Axel Moeschler || 4.75
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 |18.05.2012 Harman, François&Angela || Chloé Piraud & Matilde Orioli || note

UnigePhiloWiki - Recent changes [en]

Seminaire Discussion 2011-12

Thumos Seminar

@@ Line 80: / Line 80: @@
 Reference: Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1997) Images of Identity: In Search of Modes of Presentation, Mind, 106 (423): 499-519.
-*14.06: Monika Betzler, "Enhancing our Emotions"
+*14.06: Amanda Garcia, “What Video Games Can Teach us about Fiction and Emotions”
-Abstract:
-In current theorizing, concepts of autonomy and authenticity are used to justify measures of neuro-enhancement (NE), i.e. the use of pharmaceuticals to enhance a person’s emotions. In this article, I pursue three aims.
-(1)In light of the current debate, I show which conception of autonomy is adequate to allow, in principle at least, for uses of NE. I defend a wide notion of autonomy that remains neutral with regard to the idea of self-change, and thus allows a non-circular justification of self-change by NE. I maintain that such a wide notion of autonomy must satisfy both a control condition and a valuing condition. In addition, autonomy must be conceived as an independent value. Measures of NE can then be evaluated with respect to how they help realize the value of the person’s autonomy.
-(2) In light of these clarifications, I examine which kinds of emotional changes can be regarded as enhancing a person’s autonomy. It turns out that only the enhancement of rational emotions can serve the function to satisfy both the control and valuing conditions of autonomy.
-(3) Finally, I discuss whether NE can be regarded as an enhancement of the rationality of a person’s emotions. There are two reasons to remain skeptical: On the one hand, NE threatens to undermine two further conditions of autonomy, i.e., a person’s strength of will and her ongoing self-understanding. On the other hand, NE turns out to be problematic on conceptual grounds: Pharmaceuticals are unable to distinguish between rational and irrational emotions.
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-*21.06: Amanda Garcia, “What Video Games Can Teach us about Fiction and Emotions”
 Philosophy of fiction is often based on the examination of literary fictions. Recently, however, philosophers have argued that we have to take into account other media, in order to be able to propose comprehensive theories of fiction or art. In this context, the recent philosophical interest shown for videogames has its role to play. By considering videogames, as examples of interactive fictions, we can refine our understanding of fiction in general.
@@ Line 93: / Line 86: @@
 Contra Tavinor, I will argue that the game/work world distinction is preserved in videogames. However, interactive videogames give us reasons to question the scope of the fictional operator. This in turn motivates a second look at the scope of the fictional operator in the case of non-interactive fiction.
 In a second time, I will focus on the nature of our affective reactions to fictional works. First, interactive videogames, notably by giving us reasons to question the scope of the fictional operator, contribute to make it more plausible that we can have genuine emotions in reaction to fiction. Second, the comparison between interactive and non-interactive fictions teach us lessons as to the different kinds of affective reactions provoked by fiction.
-I will conclude by arguing that works of fiction can provoke both genuine emotions and quasi-emotions, and that the kind of fiction one engages with affects the kind of affective reactions one can have towards it.
+I will conclude by arguing that works of fiction can provoke both genuine emotions and quasi-emotions, and that the kind of fiction one engages with affects the kind of affective reactions one can have towards it.emotions.